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FOUNDATIONS AND THE PATMAN
COMMITTEE REPORT
J,ohn E. Riecker*
"The object of our study is to determine whether legislation is needed in
order to provide effective supervisory controls over tax-exempt foundations
and protect the public."1

the above words, written at the wintry beginning of 1963,
Congressman Wright Patman of Texas launched the first installment of a report to the Select Committee on Small Business of
the United States House of Representatives. The report, despite its
blunt invective and frequent emotionalism, is very likely to have
far-reaching practical, if not legal, consequences in the laws and
ethics relating to tax-exempt foundations and charitable trusts.
Congressman Patman had much to allege with respect to his Committee's accumulated evidence of foundation dominance of small
corporate business, as well as foundation abuse of the sanctuary
of income tax exemption. "Unquestionably, the economic life of
our Nation has become so intertwined with foundations that unless
something is done about it they will hold a dominant position in
every phase of American life," the Report stated.2 It continued,
"the multimillion-dollar foundations have replaced the trusts which
were broken up during the Theodore Roosevelt administration.'' 3
"Never before," the Report declared, "have the economic factors of
the complex and rapidly expanding foundation business been put
under the microscope of public scrutiny.'' 4
Chairman Patman went on to recommend an immediate moratorium on the granting of tax-exempt privileges to foundations. In
an omnibus indictment of some of the practices of the 534 foundations investigated by the Committee, Congressman Patman charged
that a concentration of economic power, coupled with laxness of
Internal Revenue Service enforcement of certain United States
Treasury regulations pertaining to foundations, had culminated in
"possible exploitation of the people's respect and admiration for
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1. CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITIEE ON SMALL BustNESS, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.,
TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR IMPACT ON OUR EcoNOMY
at v (Comm. Print 1962) (hereinafter cited as REFoRT). All references to the INTERNAL
REVENUE CooE shall mean the 1954 statute, unless otherwise stated. Relevant changes
made by the Revenue Act of 1964 will be noted in the text or footnotes.
2. REPORT at V.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at vi.
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charitable acts and gifts."5 "How can the Treasury Department possibly justify continuing to wring heavy taxes out of the farmer, the
worker, and the small businessman," the Report asks, "knowing that
people of large means are building one foundation after another,
and-for all the Treasury knows-for the purpose of decreasing
their taxes, eliminating competition and small business, subsidizing
antidemocratic propaganda, and otherwise working a hardship on
the Nation?" 6 Calling the posture of such tax-exempt organizations
a "mess," Congressman Patman proceeded to assail American taxpayers-the "stockholders" providing the subsidy for foundationsfor permitting to continue unchecked the existence of this new breed
of monopolistic power groups. A second installment of the Patman
Report, issued in October 1963, concluded that "it is evident that
nonfeasance on the part of Treasury officials has fostered tax-free
commercial activities, violations of law and Treasury regulations,
and tax avoidance through the device of foundations." 7
One cannot dispute the Patman Report's emphasis on the tremendous growth of tax-exempt foundations vis-a-vis the American
economy in general. According to the Report, there were 45,124
foundations at the end of 1960, up from 12,295 at the end of 1952.8
The 534 foundations under study by the Committee (a group composed of most, but not all, of the largest foundations) had assets of
over ten billion dollars, gross receipts during the period 1951-1960
of seven billion dollars, and aggregate gifts and grants during the same
period of 3.5 billion dollars.9 One hundred eleven of the organizations studied each owned over ten per cent of the outstanding stock
of various large and small domestic corporations, many owning in
excess of seventy per cent of particular corporations; the whole group
under scrutiny by the Committee received, during 1951-1960, over
two billion dollars in dividends from securities and 1.5 billion dollars
from gains on sale of assets.10 Expenses alone consumed over ten
per cent of aggregate receipts. 11 At the end of 1960, the Report states,
the net worth of the 534 foundations was twenty-three per cent
greater than the total capital funds of the nation's fifty largest com5. Id. at I.
6. Id. at 2.
7. CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELEcr COMMITIEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
TAX-EXEMPT FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUsrs: THEIR IMPAcr ON OUR EcoNOMY
at iii (Comm. Print 1963).
8. REPORT at V.

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid; see also id. at 4.
11. Id. at 51.
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mercial banks and twenty-six per cent greater than the invested
capital of the fifty largest merchandising firms. 12 Such figures give
some credibility to the Committee's charges that foundations possess
the power to compete with small business, with commercial banks
and lending institutions, and even with proper state and federal
government functions. One can almost feel a Sherman Act analogy
arise from the Report.
While startling in its content, the Patman Report's review of the
activities of tax-exempt organizations in the 1950's and early 1960's
is only the latest in a long series of inquiries into private charity
which have dotted the historical landscape ever since the English
Statute of Charitable Uses (1601).13 Indeed, just a decade or so ago,
intensive congressional investigation of foundation activities led to
the most drastic change in the applicable tax law in over three
hundred years: the Revenue Act of 1950.14 Actually, the Patman Report, as it has taken shape through its second installment (released late
in 1963), is unusual in that, until now, it has been exclusively the
report of a committee chairman to his committee members. No real
public hearings were held until July 1964, and full Committee participation presumably has been minimal. The Committee's subpoena
power has been limited primarily to obtaining reports and data
from some negligent, and occasionally recalcitrant, organizations.
Moreover, it has already been claimed that the Committee has exceeded its granted authority. 15 The Report is pregnant with redundancies and, at least in its first installment, is partially taken up
with nothing more than a simple, but very useful, directory of the
534 foundations and charitable trusts studied.16 Nevertheless, its
allegations and findings are provocative of the most careful notice
by tax lawyers. The gauntlet is thrown down to foundation trustees
and directors, to corporation stockholder-donors, and to charitable
12. Id. at 71. The Report also notes that true statistics are obscured in many
instances because foundations show their assets at a "carrying value," which is normally
lower than current market value.
l!!. 4!! Eliz. 1, c. 2.
14. 64 Stat. 906, 95!! (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. IV, 196!!). See
Finance Committee Reports: H. R. REP. No. 2!!19, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. !!6-!!7, 41-42
(1950); S. REP. No. 2!175, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1950); see also Brown, The New
Restrictions on Charitable Exemptions and Deductions for Federal Tax Purposes, l!!
U. P11T. L. REv. 62!! (1952); Eaton, Charitable Foundations and Related Matters Under
the 1950 Revenue Act, !!7 VA. L. REv. 1, 25!! (1951).
15. See the remarks of Roger K. Powell, N.Y.U. 22ND INST. ON FED. TAX 921-45 (1964).
16. The second installment of the REPORT, cited supra note 7, released October 16,
196!1, contained a study in depth of alleged abuses by three related foundations. The
remainder reiterated the findings and conclusions of the first installment, cited supra
note 1.
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donees all over the country. All persons critical of the content of
the Report have been challenged to justify both the legal and the
socio-political role of the modern, tax-exempt charitable corporation.
It is the purpose of this article to evaluate the major points of
the first, and main, installment of Congressman Patman's Report
in the light of existing Internal Revenue Code provisions, Treasury
regulations, and the more significant federal court decisions and
Internal Revenue Service rulings. While the Report itself is more
inclusive, space limitations dictate that this article be confined to
section 50l(c)(3) organizations-chiefly foundations, tax-exempt
funds, and charitable trusts. Although the writer will strive to be
objective, it is difficult to avoid some of the political gloss in which
the Report is cast and impossible to discuss the ramifications of the
Report without wallowing in the cross-currents of public policy.
To be exempt from income tax liability, and to afford private
donors the benefit of an income or estate tax deduction for contributions, a foundation must be both organized and operated for
an exempt purpose.17 Thus, a look at the modern application of this
aged test will be necessary in order to give perspective to Congressman Patman's allegations. This being done, we will next determine
the extent to which the law permits tax-exempt foundations to
operate businesses for profit even though their charters point to a
charitable purpose. This second inquiry relates to Congressman
Patman's charge that foundations not only divert funds to noncharitable business ventures, but also compete unfairly with legitimate businesses. Third, we shall examine Congressman Patman's
claim that the earnings of many charitable foundations are wrongly
inuring to the benefit of their own donors, trustees, and other private
persons. Fourth, the Report charges that some foundations hoard most
of their exempt income. We shall attempt to determine whether a taxexempt organization may successfully defend such a charge by showing long-range plans of charitable expenditures or whether the
Service does (and should) require prompt application of all charitable
funds. Must all foundations in the future become active, functional
charities, or may they operate as conduits to other educational and
charitable organizations? If the latter, how long and tortuous a conduit will be permitted? Fifth, we will see which foundation practices
criticized by the Report are, in fact, now prohibited by the Internal
Revenue Code; and, we will examine whether the guidelines of Code
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c)(3)-1 (1959).
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prohibitions are sufficiently definite for the Service to enforce them.
Finally, if serious abuses can be proved against tax-exempt foundations, it is relevant to ask whether these abuses can be solved and corrected by enforcement of existing laws, or whether new, more stringent laws are necessary. Implicit in these inquiries is an even more
poignant question-should charity be a private or a public concern?
This paper cannot, with any degree of wisdom, answer such questions
of "oughtness," but the Patman Report surely dramatizes the need
for asking them.
I. THE

"ESTABLISHMENT" OF FOUNDATIONS

A. The "Organizational" Test

Any corporation that aspires to become tax-exempt under section
50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code must file an application on
Treasury Form 1023 with the Internal Revenue Service, establishing,
inter alia, that it is "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals
• • • • " 18 No corporation may safely assume exemption unless such
a determination has been made by the Service. Once made, however,
the determination can be relied upon continuously by the corporation, provided there are no substantial changes in its character,
purpose, or operation and provided the corporation does not engage
in a so-called "prohibited transaction." 19 Even though the United
States Supreme Court early stated that "charities are the 'favorites'
of the law," a rule of strict construction is followed by most courts
in this country, with the result that the taxpayer must prove it
comes within the language of the exempting statute.20
The more modern view is that the term "organized" refers to
the "real substance and intent of the organization, and not to its
mere form." 21 At one time, exemption status was determined almost
18. This language from INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 50l(c)(3) has remained substantially unchanged since the Revenue Act of 1928. Approved applications for exemption on Form 1023, together with any allied papers, are available for inspection
at the Internal Revenue Service's Washington, D.C., office. See Rev. Proc. 62-30, 1962-2
CUM. BULL. 512 on the procedure governing requests for exemption, superseding in
part Rev. Proc. 56-8, 1956-1 CUM. BuLL. 1024.
19. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(a)-l(a)(l) (1958); see also Rev. Rul. 58-617, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL.
260, stating that any changes in corporate purposes or operations must be reported
promptly.
·
20. Helvering v. Bliss, 293 U.S. 144 (1934), affirming 68 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1934). Cf.
6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.02 (1957 ed.).
21. Ibid.
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exclusively by looking at the formative papers of an organizationits articles and by-laws.22 Certainly, an organization's charter is still
an important evidentiary fact to consider, but obtaining an exemption is no longer so "cut and dried." Beginning in 1938 with the
celebrated case of Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 the courts
have indicated that extrinsic evidence of the intent of the organization, as .shown by its motives, acts of charitable donation, and
management, is just as important as what appears in its charter.
Thus, in the second Commissioner v. John Danz Charitable Trust
decision,24 where a charitable trust operated active businesses (a
hotel and three candy shops) and obviously did not satisfy the
"operational" test which will be discussed later, the court still found
that the "organizational" test was met because the motive of the
trust was to aid the "humanist" movement. What this newer approach means is simply that the "organizational" test is becoming
merged with the "operational." To provide sufficient time for the
Service to study the acts as well as the charter of an applicant, the
Service has long required that organizations (except those of a
"community or public type") actively operate (not merely exist)
for twelve months before submitting Form 1023 for approval.25
Only at the end of 1963 was this rule lifted; a determination letter
will now issue in advance of twelve months of operation, providing
the applicant organization can describe its proposed exempt operations in sufficient detail.26 It is doubtful that Congressman Patman
will look with favor on this latest relaxation of procedure.
Although corporate articles have been reduced in relative importance, current regulations demonstrate that they must still be
carefully drafted for exemption. The articles, charter, or constitution must:
"(a) Limit the purposes of such organization to one or more
exempt purposes [enumerated in section 50l(c)(3)]; and
"(b) . . . not expressly empower the organization to engage,
otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one or more
exempt purposes."27
Draftsmen must be careful of powers as well as purposes. The
22. See, e.g., Sun-Herald Corp. v. Duggan, 73 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
294 U.S. 719 (1935).
23. 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938); see also Dillingham Transp. Bldg., Ltd. v. United
States, 137 Ct. Cl. 389, 146 F. Supp. 953 (1957).
24. 284 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1960), affirming, 32 T.C. 469 (1959).
25. Rev. Proc. 62-30, supra note 18.
26. Rev. Proc. 63-30, 1963-2 CUM. BULL. 769.
27. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(i) (1959).
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"organizational" test is not met if the corporate articles empower
the organization to carry on activities of a business or commercial
nature, even though such organization is limited by its articles
to an exempt purpose no broader than those listed in section 501
(c)(3).28 In composing articles of incorporation, it is easy to miss the
passage between this Scylla and Charybdis and to run aground on
taxable shoals by including the dangerous stock phrases for "carrying on business" which are part of the boilerplate of many corporate
articles. One other point needs mention with respect to drafting.
The 1959 Treasury Regulations further circumscribed the "organizational" test by providing that the purposes expressed in the
corporate articles cannot be broader than the purposes enumerated
in section 50l(c)(3). Evidence aliunde the articles will not correct
this fault.29
Although the presence of a single, substantial contrary purpose
in foundation articles will cause disqualification,80 and the articles
cannot be broader than the purposes listed in section 50l(c)(3), the
Patman Report contends that these rules are not effectively enforced.
It also makes a more profound allegation which, if not directly
stated, is certainly implied in Congressman Patman's conclusion that
any profit-making activity of tax-exempt groups reveals a non-charitable, noneleemosynary intent. If foundations are to have any
lebensraum in the future, there must be some determination of what
constitutes permissible income activity.
The problem is best illustrated by the Report's general conclusion that foundation ownership of, and receipt of profits from, such
"active" sources as the operation of rental facilities, buildings, offices,
garages, hospitals, and the like is bad. The Report also concludes that
loans by foundations, when secured by income-producing mortgages
on such active facilities (some of which inevitably are owned by
"interested parties"), are indicative of non-charitable purposes.81
Assuming a continuum of passive to active sources of income, on
one end is receipt by tax-exempt organizations of dividends from
common stocks and interest from bonds. If this is profit-making
28. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iii) (1959).
29. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iv) (1959). The last three regulations cited were
effective for taxable years after July 26, 1959.
30. See the following illustrative Tax Court cases, holding that one wrong purpose
taints the whole organization: American Institute for Economic Research v. United
States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. CI. 1962); Stevens Bros. Foundation, 39 T.C. 93 (1962), afl'd
in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963); Leon A. Beeghly
Fund, 35 T.C. 490 (1960), afl'd on other grounds, !HO F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1962); Best Lock
Corp., 31 T.C. 1217 (1959) (appeal dismissed).
31. REPORT 15-16.
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activity at all, it is certainly unimpeachable as far as the tests of
exemption are concerned, and, as a federal district court once expressed, the financial "power" of an organization to make wise
investments of this nature ought never to be viewed as a "purpose '
which must meet the organizational test. 32 The area of controversy
begins as we move from the passive end of the continuum to such
items as rents, mortgages, and leasebacks. For example, the Report
cites with disapproval the activity of three foundations in purchasing
gasoline service stations and leasing them back, together with some
other commercial buildings, to the sellers. 33 Such an investment is
not really much different from the purchase of common stocks. It
assures the receipt of regular income through rent charges, and it
can be almost as passive as the collection of interest. Of course, if the
example foundations were engaged in such management duties as
supervising the normal operations of the gasoline stations, they
would be involved in commerce and in a trade or business. However,
the mere receipt of rent, without supervisory duties, ought not to
threaten loss of exemption.
Much of ·the difficulty with the Report's conclusions in this area
lies in its failure to distinguish between the charter purpose of a
tax-exempt foundation and its sources of income.34 Thus, if the
articles of an exempt corporation stated the operation of a particular
business or businesses as a purpose, the "active" end of the continuum would be reached, and exemption would not be justified
under the organizational test. But, if the articles impose on the
trustees duties to retain, invest in, or derive income from rents,
mortgages, partnerships, etc., the organization should not be condemned for carrying out the founder's desires to assure a flow of
dollars for charitable donation. This point was illustrated in Eugene
S. Lewis v. United States.35 That case involved a testamentary trust
that had been set up by the donor to provide medical care and
educational opportunities for the youth of Sheridan County,
Wyoming. The donor's will contained an administrative clause
giving the trustees power to engage in business. The trust corpus
included a ranch formerly owned by the donor, which was maintained by the trust for a short time after his death and then sold.
In answer to the Internal Revenue Service's claim that the trust had
32. Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
33. REPORT 14.
34. This distinction was ably drawn in Bright Star Foundation v. Campbell, 191 F.
Supp. 845 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
35. 189 F. Supp. 950 (D. Wyo. 1961).
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the carrying on of a trade or business as a purpose and, thus, fell
within the prohibition of Treasury Regulation l.501(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iii),
the court held that under the will the trustees were given the power
"to carry out the express purpose of the trust," that the power to
engage in business was not a "purpose" on which exemption could
be judged, and that the organizational test was otherwise satisfied.
It would seem that the organizational test is not enforced as severely
in testamentary charitable trust cases for the very reason that the
creating instrument often imposes duties upon the trustees that are
more easily subsumed under the category of administrative powers
than under the designation of ultimate purposes.
Perhaps we could make peace with Congressman Patman's criticism of some foundations' sources of income by adopting a handy
rationale used by the Third Circuit in Francis E. McGillick Foundation v. Commissioner. 86 Construing section 101(6) of the 1939 Code,
the predecessor of section 501(c)(3), the court stated that, when the
"predominate purpose" for which a foundation is organized is, "in
its broadest sense," religious, charitable, or educational, exemption
should be granted.87 Scripture Press Foundation v. United States
stated the rule another way: if the profit-making activity is "incidental" to the organization's main charitable purpose, the demands
of the organizational test are met.88 Of course, these decisions are
not fully on point, for they speak also of what standards must be
met in order for a foundation to be organized "exclusively" for an
exempt purpose-still another qualifying test. This writer believes
that, if the distinction between the purposes of a tax-exempt foundation and its sources of income were given more sway, many of Congressman Patman's objections would disappear.
B. The "Operational" Test

This second criterion for determining tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) cannot be separated naturally from its brother, the
"organizational" test, "for the true character of an organization must
be drawn in the final analysis from the manner in which it has been
operated."30 The applicable Treasury Regulations state:

"An organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively'
for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily
36. 278 F.2d 643 (lid Cir. 1960), affirming in part, reversing in part 30 T.C. 1130
(1958).
37. 278 F.2d at 646; see also Lederer v. Stockton, 260 U.S. 3 (1922).
38. 152 Ct. Cl. 463, 285 F.2d 800 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
39. 6 MER.TENS, op. cit. supra note 20, at § 34.07.
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in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes specified in section 50l(c)(3). An organization will not be
so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities
is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose."40
At this point, it should also be noted that organizations are not
"operated exclusively" for an exempt purpose if their net earnings
inure in whole or in part to the benefit of a private individual, or if
their activities attempt to influence legislation.41
Much of what has been said about the organizational test also
applies to the operational test. No discussion of either would be
complete, however, without mentioning briefly a doctrinaire dispute
which, before 1950, raged among the federal circuits. The dispute
centered upon the question of how far a foundation may justify
dubious activity (i.e., active profit-making) by dedicating all the
fruits of that activity to a clearly exempt purpose. Almost all the
landmark cases in the area of charitable tax-exemptions were aligned
on one side or the other of this dispute. The "grandfather" case was
T-rinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, a 1924 decision of the
United States Supreme Court.42 It involved a nonprofit religious
corporation which derived ten per cent of its income from a minor
business activity-the selling of chocolates and sacramental wine.
Even had this quasi-commercial activity constituted a larger fraction
of its income, however, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court would
have denied the exemption, for the Court found that, since the
"destination" of the business income was gifts ·to religious recipients,
the organization was "operated exclusively" for religious purposes.
Commercial sales of wine were held perfectly within its permissible
operations. This pronouncement became known, not surprisingly, as
the "destination test." Under its auspices, in Roche's Beach, Inc. v.
Commissioner,43 a nonprofit corporation having charter-given duties
of operating a bathing beach (an outright commercial activity) was
nevertheless held exempt on the ground ·that the ultimate destination of the revenue was charity. "No reason is apparent to us," the
court stated, "why Congress should wish to deny exemption to a
corporation organized and operated exclusively to feed a charitable
purpose when it undoubtedly grants it if the corporation itself administers the charity." 44 The "destination of income" approach of
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Treas. Reg. § I.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(l) (1959). (Emphasis added.)
See Treas. Regs. §§ l.50l(a)-l(d) (1958) and I.503{c)-l (1959).
263 U.S. 578 (1924).
96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
Id. at 779.
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the Second Circuit was followed by the Third,45 Fifth,46 Sixth,47 and
Seventh Circuits,48 and by the Court of Claims.49
On the other side of the dispute, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
refused to accept the "destination" test as a justification for the commercial competition of a foundation with other taxable businesses.
The origin of tax-exempt income, not its destination, was the test
they applied. Ralph H. Eaton Foundation v. Commissioner5° provides an example. There, a foundation, organized exclusively for
charitable and religious purposes, operated farming, real estate, and
even sports clothes businesses, turning over the profits to exempt
organizations. The court reasoned that, although such dedication of
business profits might be an "activity," it was certainly not the
exclusive, or even the principal, activity of the foundation. Instead,
the court held the principal activity was retail sales in the stream of
commerce, and funds originating from this kind of income-producing
activity should not be exempt. Decisions of this nature remind us
once again of the tightrope courts must walk when judicial classifications are made. Since most income of most foundations is derived
from the profits of some business, it is often difficult for courts to
draw the line between a permissible origin of income and an improper one. To get around the difficulties of such a balancing act,
some courts have settled the classification of exempt income on the
grounds of the "exclusivity" of the tax-exempt's operations. This
rationale holds that, if the organization actually does operate a business, the business or activity itself must be exclusively (meaning
"primarily") charitable, educational, or religious in character.51
The battle of the circuits was resolved in favor of the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits by the Revenue Act of 1950,52 which expressly abolished the "destination of income" approach. This important legislation provides what may be the most effective machinery presently
existing for the enforcement of many of Congressman Patman's conclusions.
45. C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), reversing, 14 T.C. 922
(1950).
46. Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852
(1950).
47. Lichter Foundation v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957) and 269 F.2d 142
(6th Cir. 1959); Comm'r v. Orton, 173 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1949), affirming, 9 T.C. 533
(1947). The Lichter case, supra, however, was based on pre-1950 facts.
48. Arthur Jordan Foundation v. Comm'r, 210 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1954).
49. Dillingham Transp. Bldg., Ltd, v. United States, 137 Ct. Cl. 389, 146 F. Supp.
953 (1957).
50. 219 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1955).
51. This appears to have been the rationale in United States v. Community Servs.,
Inc., 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 842 U.S. 932 (1952).
52. 64 Stat. 906, 953, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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THE "UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME" PROBLEM

A. Competition of Foundations With Private Business
If the Patman Report has a single leading finding, it is that tax.exempt foundations are entering ·the sphere of private business,
particularly small business, and, with untaxed money, are driving
out of business corporate enterprises which must make do with fortyeight per cent of their real income. This is a seemingly well-intentioned and emphatic charge, and the Report goes to great lengths to
document it.
The Report observes that many foundations operate "testing
services," which are used by the organizations not only to assist in
studies and the granting of funds but also to attract the interest and
subscriptions of commercial corporations. It is pointed out that
seven of these tax-exempt groups grossed over 100 million dollars
from research and testing business during 1959.53 In offering tests,
data, or services to schools and businesses all over the country, exempt
testing organizations obviously occupy the same field as private
testing services which sell similar techniques, information, and
know-how to the same groups of customers. An exempt testing corporation (often the subsidiary of a larger foundation) is able, in
many instances, to outbid a private concern by quoting break-even
or even loss figures.
The attack is not confined to testing. The Report claims that
several scientific research foundations, including a well-known national society which has a net worth in excess of 26 million
dollars, 54 have, in part, jumped from "basic" research into "applied"
research. In the latter activity, specific problems are solicited from
private persons or from the federal govemment.55 Not being restrained by the economic necessity of paying taxes, of showing a
profit, of paying cash dividends, or indeed of answering to any
stockholders, the exempt groups have several built-in advantages
which could insure success in the competitive arena. The same argument is extended by the Report to tax-exempt metropolitan planning commissions, to consulting engineers, to national defense contractors, and to food and dietary researchers. All of these compete
with private, taxable counterparts.56
It is surprising that Congressman Patman does not cite, or even
53.
54.

REPORT
REPORT

9.
13.

55. Ibid.
56. REPORT 10-13.
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appear to notice, the limiting definitions of "testing for public
safety" and "scientific research" (as well as "educational," "charitable" and "religious") contained in the governing regulations under
section 50l(c)(3). "Scientific research," for example,
" ... does not include activities of a type ordinarily carried
on as an incident to commercial or industrial operations, as,
for example, the ordinary testing or inspection of materials or
products or the designing or construction of equipment, buildings, etc." 57
Instead, that term will give rise to an exemption only
" ... if the results of such research (including any patents,
copyrights, processes, or formulae resulting from such research)
are made available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis." 68
Certainly, the emphasis given to noncommercial, nondiscriminatory
research by the above definitions ought to provide a guideline of
sorts for Internal Revenue Service policing of some alleged unfair
competition between exempt and nonexempt organizations. Moreover, the same regulations circumscribe the permissible activity of
other tax-exempt "scientific organizations." For example, such
organizations may not limit the fruits of their research to their
creators (often the "creators" are profit corporations in the same line
of business), and they may not retain ownership of more than an
insubstantial portion of the patents, formulae, etc., resulting from
their research.59
B. "Feeder' Corporations
Although the Code definitions of such terms as "scientific research" and "testing for public safety" seem to exclude the abuses
Congressman Patman talked about, specific sanctions to prevent
these abuses appeared in the 1950 legislation. By that year, actual
instances of unfair competition between exempt and nonexempt
organizations had mounted to such a point that Congress determined
to correct the situation.60 A nationwide vendor of macaroni, for example, could receive its profits free of tax because they were destined
for an educational institution.fl 1 A commercial beach operator en57. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(ii) (1961).
58. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(iii)(a) (1961).
59. Treas. Reg. §' l.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(5)(iv) (1961).
60. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1950); see also Veterans Foundation v. United States, 281
F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960), affirming 178 F. Supp. 234 (D. Utah 1959).
61. See C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951), reversing 14 T.C.
922 (1950).
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joyed the same advantage over its competition because it directed its
net profits to charity.62 As a result of such inequities, some basic safeguards calculated to control active business competition by taxexempts were enacted. No longer could the excuse of charitable
destination of income secure a free ticket to tax exemption.
First, the Revenue Act of 1950 provided (by what is now section
502, Internal Revenue Code) that an organization operated for the
"primary purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit" is not
exempt merely because all of its profits are payable to some organization that is exempt. 63 Such so-called "feeder corporations" were
thenceforth taxable at full corporate rates, just as any nonexempt
corporation in the same line of business. Second, even though a
corporation's primary purpose was within one of the section 501
(c)(3) exemptions, if it did in fact carry on a trade or business
"unrelated" to its exempt purpose, the new legislation (now section 511 of the Code) imposed the regular corporate tax on the
income derived from the "unrelated business." 64 Corporations in
this second classification, however, were still exempt provided they
carried on substantial charitable activities to which, by definition,
their trade or business activity could be "unrelated." The tax
imposed on the unrelated activity was to have no adverse effect
upon the organization's exempt status. Only one concession was
made to pre-1950 rules. If an exempt corporation owned active
income-producing property (as distinguished from stocks, bonds, or
other intangibles), such income remained exempt under the 1950
changes, provided the corporation was organized for the exclusive
purpose of "holding title to [the] property, collecting income therefrom, and turning over the entire amount thereof, less expenses, to
an organization which is itself exempt. . .." 65 Such "title-holding
corporations" are to be clearly distinguished from corporations
actually carrying on some trade or business.66
Section 513(a) of the Internal Revenue Code defines an "unrelated trade or business" as follows:
" ... any trade or business the conduct of which is not sub62. See Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-l(a) (1958). The 1950.legislation referred to in the text be•
came §§ 421-24 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and was known as "Supplement
U." A good discussion of this statute can be found in Sugarman &: Pomeroy, Business
Income of Exempt Organizations, 46 VA. L. REv. 424 (1960).
64. However, "unrelated business income" of a church is still exempt from income
taxation. For the definition of a "church," see De La Salle Institute v. United States,
195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
65. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 50l(c)(2); Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(2)-l(a) (1958).
66. Ibid.
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stantially related (aside from the need of such organization for
income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to
the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function ...."
However, a trade or business engaged in by the exempt organization without compensation, or which the organization carries on
for the convenience of its members, officers, or employees, or which
involves the sale of merchandise donated to the organization, is
not "unrelated" and, therefore, is within the pale of permissibility. 67
Two conditions are required for taxability of such business income.
First, the "unrelated trade or business" must involve activity substantially different from that authorized by the exempt corporation's
articles. Second, the "unrelated trade or business" must be "regularly carried on" by the corporation. 68
Sporadic, intermittent, or isolated business activity engaged in
by a foundation is not considered enough of a deviation from
exempt operations to cause imposition of tax. Nor, of course, is the
receipt of dividends, interest, royalties from natural resources, bald
rents from real estate, or capital gains from non-inventory property
called "unrelated income" ;69 all of these items are sufficiently passive
in character to demonstrate that their mere receipt is not the same
as the carrying on of a trade or business.70 Similarly, the purchase or
ownership of oil production payments is not treated in the same
way as oil prospecting or active participation in oil drilling. 71 And,
all income derived by fundamental research organizations from research performed for any person is not "unrelated" if the results are
made freely available to the public.72 The same is true of research
performed for the federal government or for any state or political
subdivision.73
It must be emphasized that the term "trade or business" (which
is common to sections 502 and 512) must be read with the requirement that such activity be a primary purpose of the organization
67. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 513(a)(l)-(3). Nor does the term "trade or business"
include the renting out by an exempt organization of its own real property. The latter
activity is governed by the provisions of INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 514, which deal with
business leases and business lease indebtedness. Generally, rental income from real
estate is taxable to otherwise exempt organizations, with the exception of churches, to
the extent that the property is purchased with borrowed funds. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 5ll(a).
68. See Treas. Reg. § l.513-l(a)(2) (1958); see also INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 512(a)69. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(l)-(3), (5) ..
70. See Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
71. Force Foundation v. United States, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,r 9115 (N.D. Tex. 1962).
72. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(9).
73. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b)(7).
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before the organization can be written off as a feeder. All circumstances, including the size and extent of the trade or business, as
well as the comparable size and scope of the exempt activity, must
be taken into account in determining a primary purpose. 74

C. Enforcement in the Courts
There is a practical answer and an answer grounded on policy
to the question of whether the existence of the rules regarding
feeder corporations and unrelated business income refutes the Patman Report's conclusion that the penalty of loss of exemption
should be imposed upon a foundation engaging in business, even
indirectly. The practical, demonstrable answer is found in the
enforcement courts have given to the 1950 legislation. An example
is provided by the recent Court of Claims decision in SICO Foundation v. United States.75 Plaintiff in that case was a nonstock, charitable corporation that had owned controlling stock interests in
several other corporations engaged in the sale and distribution of
petroleum products. Through their dissolution, plaintiff acquired
the assets of these subsidiaries and commenced direct operation of
their businesses. In an earlier decision, the court had ruled plaintiff
exempt despite this take-over, because the destination of its profits
was an educational scholarship program.76 Indeed, plaintiff had
continued to distribute all its income in this manner. But, once the
1950 Revenue Act became applicable, plaintiff found itself back
before the court, again defending its right to an exemption. On this
second confrontation, the court found plaintiff to be a nonexempt
feeder corporation, saying:
"That it [plaintiff] gave all its profits to an educational
institution availeth it nothing in the mundane field of taxation,
however much the children in our schools have profited from
its beneficence." 77
Plaintiff's argument that, instead of losing its exemption, it should
be taxable only on its unrelated business income also was found to
"availeth it nothing," since plaintiff had no direct charitable or
educational activities to which such income could be "unrelated."
Significantly, the court persevered in its holding despite the foundation's claim that not all of its income originated from the petroleum
business, but that substantial passive income in the form of interest
74.
75.
76.
77.

Treas. Reg. § 1.502-l(a) (1958).
155 Ct. Cl. 554, 295 F.2d 924 (1961).
SICO Co. v. United States, 121 Ct. Cl. 373, 102 F. Supp. 197 (1952).
295 F.2d 924, 925 (1961).
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and rent was earned. The answer to this, the court remarked, is
that Congress did not limit the scope of section 301(b) of the 1950
Revenue Act to organizations whose exclusive purpose was the
conduct of a trade or business; the effect of that section extended
to those whose primary purpose was such activity.78
During the same year as the SICO decision, the Court of Claims
reinforced its viewpoint. In Scripture Press Foundation v. United
States, 70 plaintiff foundation had succeeded to the business of an
Illinois profit corporation that prepared and sold religious literature
and received large profits therefrom. The court conceded that
large profits did not necessarily mean that the organization was
non-charitable, although such commercial success was certainly some
evidence of a business character. However, despite the meritorious
goals of the foundation, its improvement of Sunday Schools, and its
furnishing of religious materials, the court held that the test of
exemption was not met-the sale of religious literature was not
incidental to the foundation's religious activities but was, instead,
its primary activity. In so holding, the court also noticed that, in
1957, the foundation had 1.6 million dollars in accumulated capital
and surplus and only 72 thousand dollars in expenditures.
The Tenth Circuit came to a like conclusion in Veterans
Foundation v. United States, 80 wherein plaintiff claimed exemption
£or profits gained from thrift sales of used clothing and other
merchandise in two Utah stores. The sales operation was held
to be the primary purpose of the foundation, making it a classic
feeder corporation. The Ninth Circuit had an even more obvious
violation of tax-exempt purposes before it in Randall Foundation,
Inc. v. Riddell.81 There, a nonprofit corporation had been formed
with a rather vague charitable design. Actually, the organization's
chief activity was the buying, selling, and trading of oil stocks and
other securities, an occupation which paralleled similar individual
activity of its donor to the extent that the same brokers were often
used by both. Although the profits and gains of the corporation
did not inure directly to the donor, the court found that the chief
purpose of the foundation was to engage in highly speculative business transactions. With little difficulty, the feeder corporation provisions were invoked.
78. Id. at 928.
79. 152 Ct. Cl. 463, 285 F.2d 800 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962); cf., A. A.
Allen Revivals, Inc., 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1435 (1963).
80. 281 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1960), affirming 178 F. Supp. 234 (D. Utah 1959).
81. 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957).
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The Court of Claims, whose decisions figure most prominently
in this area, in 1962 decided a case, the language of which somewhat clairvoyantly furnishes an example of the kind of judicial
vigilance Congressman Patman now asks. In American Institute for
Economic Research v. United States, 82 plaintiff education corporation's articles properly limited it to economics study and the dissemination of economic information to the general public. In operation, however, it published two periodicals that gave investment
advice, analyses of certain traded securities, and even pointers on
how subscribers should vote on pending corporate mergers. Plaintiff further provided a continuous supervision service for some three
hundred clients, charging one-fourth of one per cent of the capital
involved as a service fee. Insurance advice and estate planning were
other aids made available. In 1957 and 1958, plaintiff had received
almost half a million dollars from subscriptions to these services. The
court found that such services were those commonly associated with
commercial enterprises and held that, since plaintiff had chosen to
compete with business firms offering similar services, it was a feeder
corporation and must bear the tax consequences of its acts. 88
To be sure, loopholes have arisen in the interstices among
the above holdings and among the controlling regulations. A foundation may freely create a wholly-owned subsidiary that does nothing
but engage in commercial activity. While the subsidiary itself is
taxed, the income later passed on to the exempt parent corporation
is not "unrelated" business income to the parent.84 Conceivably,
the door is open for a foundation to create several small business
subsidiaries within the lower normal tax bracket; favorable overall
tax results would thereby be achieved, provided the overriding
organizational and operational tests were met. Another avenue of
escape from the feeder corporation rules is illustrated by the Court
of Claims decision in Hospital Bureau of Standards and Supplies,
Inc. v. United States. 85 There, the plaintiff bought supplies at a
discount and performed research and other technical services for
several charitable hospitals that took memberships in plaintiff. All
of plaintiff's net income from dues and discounts was returned to
the members as patronage dividends. Plaintiff was held not to be
a feeder, the court pointing out that it performed services for its
82. 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
83. Id. at 938.
84. See Amon G. Carter Foundation v. United States, 58·1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(N.D. Tex. 1958).
85. 141 Ct. Cl. 91, 158 F. Supp. 560 (1958).
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members that they otherwise would have had to assume themselves.
Plaintiff's operations, even though commercial, were excused on the
basis that they bore a "close and intimate relationship" to the very
functioning of the exempt hospitals. A third route around the
unrelated business income provisions lies in Internal Revenue Code
section 501(c)(4), which deals with civic organizations and organizations operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare. Tax
lawyers will agree that often the purposes of a section 50l(c)(3)
educational or charitable organization spill over into those of an
organization for social welfare. While contributions to the latter are
not deductible by the donor, 86 a social welfare organization does not
pay a tax on unrelated business income.87 Thus, a choice of taxable
consequences is open to organizations having this dual identity.
D. Policy Considerations
Wholly aside from the monitoring of foundations' business
activities by the courts, are there reasons why foundations should
be divorced from commercial activity altogether-even if such activity leads only to a tax on unrelated business income? Congressman Patman deplores all degrees of business activity by foundations.
We should look briefly at the arguments on each side of this
question.
Foundation trustees can be expected to maintain that often an
unrelated business provides a valuable source of charitable funds at
higher yields than more passive investments. They question the
validity of a distinction between stock in the business and the
business itself. Moreover, many organizations are simply given or
bequeathed such businesses by some donor, and they have no possible alternative but to assume control and run the enterprise in
the best manner possible. To confiscate or even penalize such
inheritance, it is argued, would often work a hardship on the
exempt organization and cause it, particularly if it is a charitable
trust, to act in violation of the donative intent. Finally, it is contended that there is persuasive analogy in the fact that profit corporations freely carry on exempt activities and have exempt appendages (qualified pension trusts are an obvious example).
But Congressman Patman makes a definite point in his assertions. To a small commercial operation, the incidental benefits in
being operated by a large and rich foundation are weighty enough
86, Such organizations are excluded from the benefits of INT. REv. Com;:

OF

§ 170(c).

87. See Veterans Foundation v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 234 (D. Utah 1959).
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to be anti-competitive in many instances. Imagine the effect of the
name, publicity, and resources of the Ford Foundation behind a
small profit operation selling reference books. To be sure, the
business income derived would form an infinitesimal part of the
Foundation's gross income, but the weight of the Foundation's name
and reputation, maintained by tax-free funds, would be magnified
greatly among competing reference book firms. In many instances,
the commercial activity carried on by the foundation is not "inherited" or thrust upon it, but rather is entered into out of free
choice and in near oblivion to countless profit corporations that
could perform the same activity for hire. The danger to foundations-all foundations-in such practice is the danger of swinging
too far off the base of functional charitable activity. A charitable
hospital can rightly open its doors to sick and infirm indigents, but it
should not use its capital, its plant, its accumulated equipment, and
its generally tax-free overhead to treat those who have adequate
funds and hospitalization insurance. Of course, the "organizational"
test would certainly permit a hospital to charge fees covering its costs
and expenses. The activity of an economics research institute in
selling or giving out advice on the stock market is in a different
category. Even if this service "flows naturally" from exempt activity,
the presence of thousands of profit-making taxable investment and
stock analysis firms suggests that a foundation which engages in such
activity is roaming far beyond its functional charitable or educational base.
Distinctions in this area are admittedly arbitrary at times. Criteria
defining correct practices are often penumbra!. Perhaps a "charitable purpose" doctrine, similar to the "business purpose" test of
tax law jurisprudence, would serve to cull out the desirable incidental foundation competitiveness from that which might have a
more predatory purpose and effect. On the one hand, no tax-exempt
organization that has an active business thrust upon it (as by gift or
inheritance) should be forced to incur the hardship of a sacrificial
divestiture, particularly when the donor's basis must be assumed.
On the other hand, purchase by a foundation of a hotel, an office
building, a retail bookstore, or a manufacturing plant points as
much to a purpose of active business engagement as it does to a
purpose of securing a higher yield of income for charitable purposes. Voluntary acquisitions of this nature should result in a heavy
burden of proof being placed on the acquiring foundations to show
a predominant charitable purpose behind the acquisition.
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INUREMENT OF FOUNDATION FUNDS TO PRIVATE BENEFIT
AND THE "PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS" RULE

A. The Problem
To this point we have discussed the face that foundations turn to
the public-how much participation in non-charitable commercial
activities courts will allow tax-exempt organizations. What is lesser
known, and in this writer's opinion far more important, is the
private life of foundations within and among their own donors,
trustees, and related profit corporations. The balance of this article
is devoted to this interior problem-how it is manifested in innerdealings between foundations and their creators, in so-called "prohibited transactions" engaged in by foundations, and in foundation
accumulation or "hoarding" of income. For analytical purposes, it is
impossible to put these three practices into neat categories; they overflow upon one another both in the Code and in actual occurrence.
Perhaps as good a way as any to begin is by discussing the inurement of foundation funds to private persons (e.g., donors, trustees,
donors' relatives, etc.). A prohibition against su~h inurement first
appears in the definitional section of the Code, section 50l(c)(3).
But the regulations implementing this section are not as enlightening
as the standards set forth in section 503, dealing with "prohibited
transactions" which, if violated, will result in revocation of exempt
status. Our inquiry must bridge both sections of the statute because
the various "prohibited transactions" are really specific examples
of how foundation income can wrongly "inure" to the benefit of
private persons. The charges made by the Patman Report in this
area provide a good introduction.
Indeed, one need not read far into the Report before encountering cited instances of inner-dealing between tax-exempt groups
and other interested parties. One instance cited involved a bank
(Bank X) which held control (with another bank) of a large dealer
in United States Government bonds, bankers acceptances, and
negotiable time certificates. It had gradually acquired stock in the
dealer from 1918 to 1959. Bank X's cost basis for the stock was
1.548 million dollars. Bank X established a charitable trust and
contributed to it the stock in the dealer at a time when the stock
was worth 2.493 million dollars on the market. Eight months later,
the charitable trust sold the same stock to foundations and institutional investors. After the sale, the trust filed for and received a
Treasury letter granting tax-exemption retroactively to a date before
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the sale. The Report criticized Bank X for avoiding a capital gains
tax on almost one million dollars, calling the charitable trust a
handy medium for the shelter of an otherwise taxable profit.BB
Other abuses are cited. Foundations are said to be "agents of
concentration," often holding over ten per cent of the outstanding
stock of a corporation.89 Control of such a corporation can then be
managed by an easy, casual alliance between the foundation's holdings and the holdings of the donor's family members. Nonvoting
stock held by a family foundation can sometimes be converted to
voting stock.90 Private individuals, often the donor or the donor's
family, may receive annuities from a tax-exempt organization. And
aside from gifts, related persons or corporations may receive loans
of money from foundations that they have either created or supported.91 The Report cites one large foundation loan to a private
corporation which bore an interest rate of only 2.65 per cent.92
Finally, donors have been known to repurchase assets from their
foundations, getting a stepped-up cost basis free of tax in the process.93 Too often, it seems, foundations have been the wheel horses
for quick recapture of securities-at higher cost bases and with no
tax on double or even triple appreciation of values.
The Patman Report also cites transactions between corporationcreated foundations and the same corporation's employees-particularly transactions involving scholarships, fellowships, and other educational benefits. Another use made of the characteristic liquidity
of foundations is the payment of heavy federal estate taxes owed
by the donors' executors.94 Indeed, in all such instances, collusion
and inner-dealing have been charged by the Report as being rampant, uncontrollable, and yet perfectly within existing law and regulations.

B. The Statute
Regulations implementing section 50I(c)(3) state: "An organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if
its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private
shareholders or individuals."915 The words "private shareholder or
individual" refer to persons who have a personal and private interest
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See REPORT 8-9.
See id. at 8.
Ibid.
Loan abuses are cited in id. at 80.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 81.
Ibid.
Treas. Reg. § l.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(2) (1959).
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in the activities of the organization.96 To discover what constitutes
such inurement and who might have such a private interest, we
must turn to the regulations under section 503 of the Code. Those
regulations outline certain transactions that are prohibited if they
inure to the private advantage of any of the following:
I. The creator of the organization (if a trust),
2. Any substantial contributor to the organization,
3. A member of the family of the creator or substantial contributor, or
4. A corporation in which at least fifty per cent of the
outstanding voting stock is owned by the creator or substantial
contributor.97
In pertinent (and oversimplified) part, the prohibited transactions
are:
I. Loans to the persons or corporations enumerated above
"without receipt of adequate security or a reasonable rate of
interest." 98 "Adequate security" means something more than a
mere promise to pay. Security cannot be the stock of the corporate borrower, but a mortgage on other property of the borrower of sufficient value so that foreclosure would liquidate the
debt can be adequate security.99
2. Payment of any compensation in excess of a reasonable
allowance for salaries for personal services actually rendered
(presumably not blanket retainer fees) to the persons or corporations listed above,
3. Furnishing any services on a preferential basis to such
persons or corporations,
4. Purchasing a substantial amount of securities or other
property at more than an adequate consideration from such
persons or corporations,
5. Selling a substantial amount of the foundation's own
securities or other property for less than an adequate consideration to such persons or corporations,
6. Engaging in any other transactions which cause a substantial diversion of income or corpus to such persons or corporations.100
In gauging the Patman Report criticism in this area, it is significant to note that none of the above items prohibit inner-dealing
96. Treas. Reg. § l.50l(a)-l(c) (1958).
97. See Treas. Reg. § l.50!1(c)-l(a) (1959). Family membership is determined by the
rules of INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 267(c)(4).
98. Treas. Reg. § l.50!1(c)-l(a) (1959).
99. See examples given under Treas. Reg. § l.50!1(c)-l(c) (1959). See also Donald G.
Griswold, !19 T.C. 620 (1962).
100. These six types of transactions have been substantially copied from INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 50!1(c). Except for § 50!1(c)(l), the remaining paragraphs are not elaborated or further explained in the regulations.
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per se. Indeed, the pre-enactment materials relating to section 503
(section 331 of the Revenue Act of 1950) show that at first it had
been proposed to deny deductions to donors if any substantial fraction of the recipient organization's assets were used to purchase
securities or other property from the donors or from other trustees.
However, the committee that reported on the bill believed that
such a provision would have been too harsh, and no objection was
seen to inner-dealings provided they were conducted at arm's
length.101 Such has been the rule since 1950. One would have to bar
dealings between foundations and interested parties completely
to change it.
While the prohibitions listed above appear fairly inclusive, there
are at least two gaping lacunae in the statute. The first is that a taxexempt organization, if acting incidentally to its charter purpose, is
not prohibited by this statutory language from furnishing preferential services to, giving securities to, or paying an honorarium or
some unearned gratuity to a private person or corporation which
is not within one of the four categories of recipients spelled out in
the regulations under section 503(c).102 Thus, at this juncture, the
statute would seem justifiably exposed to the criticism that exempt
funds can find their way into indi'1idual, nonexempt hands, unless
interpretative cases and commentary have narrowed this apparent
liberality.
The second area excepted from the "policeman" requirements
of section 503 is composed of those organizations listed in section
503(b)-religious organizations, schools with regular faculties and
curricula, federal, state or public-supported organizations, and
medical care, medical education, or medical research organizations.
As to these broad exceptions, the six types of prohibited transactions
enumerated above are not limitations. Nevertheless, it has been held
that even these more unfettered groups are still subject to the
general, and more basic, standard of section 50l(c)(3)-the injunction that net earnings may not inure to private benefit.103
101. See S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36-37, 123 (1950); 1950-2 CUM. BULL.
483, at 510-511, 571; and CoNF. REP. No. 3124, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950), 1950-2
CuM. BULL. 580, 591. Cf., Revenue Act of 1964, P.L. 88-272, § 209(d)(l), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 170 (1964), which amends INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170 by adding § 170(g). Section
170(g)(4) provides that even arm's-length purchases or sales of securities by foundations
to donors, family members, donors' employees, and officers or employees of controlled
corporations will result in disqualification of such foundations from the "unlimited
charitable contributions deduction" unless the transaction involves only "a minimal
amount of securities or other property." Query: will this specific disqualification become
a more general "prohibited transaction" at some future time?
102. See -materials cited note 97 supra.
103. For a recent case, see Kenner v. Comm'r, 318 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1963), affirming
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Before discussing how the courts have interpreted these provisions, it should be noted parenthetically that the section of the
Internal Revenue Code that deals with individual deductions of
charitable contributions from income subject to tax-section l 70(c)
(2)-also contains the section 50l(c)(3) standard of inurement and
adds the further prohibition that no substantial part of the activities
of a tax-exempt organization may be used to carry on propaganda or
attempt to influence legislation. This latter activity also amounts to
a prohibited transaction; but the Patman Report does not emphasize
any political role that foundations may be playing. The writer will
omit further mention of this activity in the interest of space limitation.

C. Significant Cases
The sweep of the general checkrein on inner-dealing-that
foundation earnings may not inure to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals-has been broadened in scope by at least
one learned commentator:
"[I] fa particular individual or limited number of individuals
reap commercial benefits from the operation of the instrumentality, though they do not do so by direct acquisition or payment over to them of its earnings, the earnings may nevertheless 'inure' to their 'benefit' ...." 104
But several courts have given the general inurement standard of
section 50l(c)(3) a very literal interpretation and have permitted
a variety of inner-dealing, thus adding some justification to Congressman Patman's criticism. In Boman v. Commissioner,1° 5 a foundation which ovmed a clinic building leased the furnishings and
equipment to a partnership of practicing physicians who controlled
the foundation. The court observed that the partner-physicians
received no free services from the foundation and that they paid
an adequate rental for the facilities, even though, as trustees of the
foundation, they controlled the rental rate. In upholding exemption, the court quoted a 1938 case, Northwestern Municipal Association v. United States, on "incidental benefits":
"If its [the charitable corporation's] main purpose is to
benefit its shareholders or individuals it is not exempt. On the
20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 185 (1961) (the donor-physician had loaned money to the
hospital but had also at later times withdrawn substantial sums from hospital accounts to pay his own bills).
104, 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.13 (1957 ed.).
105. 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 660 (1956).
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other hand, if benefit to the individuals is secondary and incidental, it is exempt." 106
This principle was carried even further in Huron Clinic Foundation v. United States, 101 a very liberal decision. The plaintiff
foundation in that case had leased a building to an association of
physicians. The Commissioner argued that the rental paid by the
physicians (and hence their expense deduction) was high and that
the charitable contributions made by the foundation were small,
so small that a surplus of three times the foundation's annual gross
income had accumulated. Despite this, and despite the power of the
foundation to set the rent, the court held there was no improper
inurement.
Nor does favoritism or "selectivity" of beneficiaries necessarily
result in a finding of inurement as long as the selectivity is among
charitable objects. For example, a recent charitable trust specified
that contributions to a country hospital district for free hospital
rooms should go first to the specific trust beneficiaries, then to such
other persons (presumably unrestricted) as the hospital directors
might choose. Although this manner of disposition of benefits was
held not exclusively charitable, the court's decision conceded that,
had all the trust beneficiaries been needy or indigent, there would
be no illegality.108 Indeed, the word "charitable" implies a service
or a gift for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons.109 If the
donor's relatives or other interested parties are incidentally members of that general class, inurement to them of benefits is not fatal
to tax exemption. Thus, while class membership will permit receipt
of benefits, the donor, his trustees, or family members may not be
disproportionate recipients and obviously may not stand out in the
class. For example, where a taxpayer's son was one of a number of
free patients in a tax-exempt crippled children's organization, the
taxpayer was still allowed a deduction for his contribution.110 But,
where a corporation organized an educational foundation to provide
educational opportunities to its employees' children, a director of
the corporation was not allowed to deduct his contribution to the
foundation while his own child was receiving thirty per cent of the
total funds.111
106. 99 F.2d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 1938).
107. 212 F. Supp. 847 (S.D.S.D. 1962), remanded by 324 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1963).
108. United States v. Bank of America Nat'! Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 317 F.2d 859 (9th
Cir. 1963).
109. Rev. Rul. 56-138, 1956-1 Cu:M. BULL. 202; Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 CUM. BULL.
306.
llO. Marshall v. Welch, 197 F. Supp. 874 (S.D. Ohio 1961).
Ill. Charleston Chair Co. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 126 (E.D.S.C. 1962).
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Nor is a charitable foundation precluded from making grants
or distributions to individuals who are not members of a class,
provided the distributions are made on a true charitable basis and
in furtherance of the foundation's exempt purposes.112 Adequate
case histories must be maintained showing personal information
with respect to the recipient and his relationship (if any) to members, donors, or trustees of the foundation.11 8 This result is eminently sound. Individuals, as much as groups, are legitimate objects
of charity. An indigent, needy, uneducated, or diseased individual
is one of an unlimited class of persons which in Judaeo-Christian
society has been traditionally assisted by the kindness and generosity
of those more fortunate.
Situations involving a foundation dominated by a single individual have occasioned the greatest ·controversy and have presented a
strong appearance of inurement to private benefit. The entertainment industry provides dramatic examples. In The Bob and Dolores
Hope Charitable Foundation v. District Director of Internal Revenue,m the donor had assigned to the foundation all of his rights in
his life story. The foundation then entered into publication agreements for the story. It was held that this was not a business activity,
but rather, that the foundation was simply converting its rights, a
valuable asset, to cash in order to more easily carry out its exempt
purpose. Nor was this of substantial benefit to the donor, since
he was a public figure anyway. But, in Horace Heidt Foundation v.
United States, 115 the Court of Claims found that the donor's foundation had taken over the business of merchandising souvenir programs that were inspired by the donor's entertainment tours of the
country. The profits were dedicated to young entertainers located
by talent scouts and served to furnish them with food and lodging.
However, because all the beneficiaries were employed by Heidt
and helped in presenting the Heidt shows, the profits were held to
have inured to the donor's direct benefit.
Much the same relationship is often involved between a foundation and a profit corporation where common directorships may or
may not be involved. In Science and Research Foundation) Inc. v.
United States,11 6 a foundation contracted with a corporation, the
latter agreeing to print and distribute books for the foundation
and to pay back to it a royalty. The arrangement resulted in con112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See 2 CASNER, EsrATE PLANNING 880 n.10 (1961 ed.).
See Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 306 for procedure.
61-1 CCH U.S. Tax Cas. 1J 9437 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
145 Ct. Cl. 322, 170 F. Supp. 634 (1959).
181 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
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siderable profit to the corporation, causing the challenge that the
foundation was actually subsidizing the corporation. The foundation held no proprietary interest in the corporation. It was held
that the profits were merely payment for services rendered and
that, in the area of payment for services, foundations have obligations common to any other purchaser or contractor. The relationship was not nearly as disinterested, however, in the recent decision
of Stevens Brothers Foundation, Inc. v. Commissioner. 111 There the
four founders were also partners in a contracting firm which, in
turn, owned two-thirds of the stock of a construction company. The
latter company needed cash in order to purchase a large construction
bid bond. The foundation advanced the money in exchange for onehalf of the profits expected from the construction contract plus repayment of the advance. Subsequently, the foundation's advance was
extended on a like basis to other construction contracts, and ultimately the advance exceeded three-quarters of a million dollars (for
which interest was deferred). The court held the foundation's resulting profit clearly was not "incidental" to its exempt activities. An
appreciable amount of its funds had been used in a manner which,
while beneficial to it financially, also resulted in the rescue of a profit
corporation at a time when the latter had not been able to get additional financing (an act of charity, but not consistent with tax exemp. ..
')
uon
It is worth noting that, when a tax-exempt organization is found
to have engaged in one of the section 503 "prohibited transactions,"
it is denied exemption only for taxable years after the year of
official notification that it has engaged in a prohibited transaction,
unless it entered into such transaction with the purpose of diverting
corpus or income from its exempt purpose and such transaction
involved a substantial part of its corpus or income. 118 This rule
places quite a duty of vigilance on the Service. On the other hand,
it also recognizes that disinterested donors may be the last to
discover that the recipient of their gifts has violated the Code; thus,
it protects the deductibility of their contributions in the year
made.
D. Some Observations on Inurement
Do the above decisions indicate an "appearance of evil" which
would justify the Patman Report's charges of wrongful inner-dealing
within foundations and among interested parties? As we have
117. 39 T.C. 93 (1962), afl'd in part, reu'd in part, 324 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1963).
118. See !NT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 503(a)(2).
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seen, nowhere does the Internal Revenue Code prohibit arm'slength transactions between a donor, his foundation, and the foundation's trustees_. And it is fair to say that, when courts have found
such dealing to be at less than arm's length, the boom of exemption
denial has almost always been lowered. But, in many instances,
courts have judged the ingredients of the situation· too formalistically, without much regard for very real collusion or identity of
interest between the parties.119 "Indirect" benefits can often lead in
indirect ways to redounding direct benefits. This is particularly
true among foundations that hold controlling stock interests in
profit corporations. A corporation so controlled is assured of a
friendly, often accommodating (even at arm's length) major stockholder. The foundation, in tum, may contribute to causes, persons,
or institutions who will not be unfriendly to the commercial interests of the corporation. An environment is thus created in which
collusive power, even though unexercised, can exist. Similar potential exists between the donor and his family-controlled foundation.
Inner-dealing of this type may remain superficially objective and
disinterested; yet loan arrangements between the foundation and
its founder, even at the going interest rate, automatically exclude
the bidding of commercial banks. And the statutory permission to
pay reasonable salaries for services actually rendered may lead to
payments to qualifying family members. We may well ask the question so familiar to students of antitrust law and policy-is the
existence of the power per se evil?
On the other hand, one should think twice before advocating
unnecessary chastity between substantial donors and recipient taxexempt groups. Despite the power of abuse that inheres in the
regulations and rules we have just discussed, there is danger in
penalizing a foundation merely because of its fortuitous (and often
enviable) connection with a productive and talented donor or
trustee, or because of the high yield it may receive from securities
it may hold in a close, controlled corporation. Good as well as bad
results may derive from such associations. The services a foundation
receives from or through its founder could be unique and far better
than those otherwise available to it. This is to say that the rules of
section 503 should not be tightened too arbitrarily for the sake of
removing anti-competitive influence; rather, a burden of going
forward with evidence of justification should be placed on founda119. The decision in Huron Clinic Foundation, 212 F. Supp. 84'7 (S.D.S.D. 1962),
remanded by ll24 F.2d 4ll (8th Cir. 196ll), is an example.
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tions having inner-dealings with interested parties. In this connection, it should be noted that questions concerning all six of the prohibited transactions of section 503(c) are asked of all reporting
foundations on Parts I and II of Treasury Form 990-A (the annual
information return required of section 50l(c)(3) organizations),
and positive answers must be explained. It is believed that full
answers to these questions would go a long way toward satisfying
Congressman Patman's objections.
One final point needs mention with respect to inner-dealings of
charitable inter vivos and testamentary trusts. Often, one finds a
trust of this type carrying on its exempt purpose in good measure,
but also paying out part of its net income as an annuity to, or retaining the personal services of, a related or interested individual.
This seemingly nepotic practice is defensible on the basis of the socalled doctrine of "prior charge." For example, suppose a testamentary charitable trust instrument directs that there be paid an annuity for life to a grandniece of the testator. Such payment is not
really a "condition" imposed upon the existence of the trust, but
merely the liquidation of a legacy. In such a situation, payment of
the necessary sum (out of principal if need be) has been upheld.120
Likewise, when property is transferred inter vivos to a private
foundation with a present charge that a life income be paid to a
designated private individual, quite clearly the foundation receives
a vested remainder interest which is ascertainable, capable of valuation, and in all respects immune from any charge that favoritism or
inner-dealing is the motive. 121 Readily distinguishable from these
situations, of course, would be voluntary private payments by the
tax-exempt organization when there is no prior charge. It has been
suggested that segregation of the necessary assets within the trust or
foundation will prevent a prior or present charge from being challenged.122 This doctrine of segregation was extended in an interesting
way by the Court of Claims in Wells b Wade, Inc. v. United States. 128
By their wills, a donor and his wife provided that their stock in two
operating, profit corporations would go to a foundation. Upon the
death of the donor, one of his co-executors borrowed a large sum
of money from a bank in order to pay the estate administration
expenses. In response to the bank's demand for security, the foun120. T,llese were the facts and holding in Eugene S. Lewis v. United States, 189 F.
Supp. 950 (D. Wyo. 1961).
121. Wm. L. Powell Foundation v. Comm'r, 222 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1955), reversing
21 T.C. 279 (1954).
122. Wm. L. Powell Foundation v. Comm'r, supra note 121, at 74.
123. 150 Ct. Cl. 819, 280 F.2d 825 (1960).
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dation executed an indemnity contract. Although there was no prior
charge placed on the foundation by the donor's will, the court in
effect excused allegations of inner-dealing by holding that, since
the foundation was the residuary legatee of the estate, it was justified
in guaranteeing the loan rather than risking the sale of some of
the estate corpus to satisfy it.124 The loan could later be repaid out
of the operating profits of the two corporations.
IV. AccuMULATIONS

A. The Problem
Congressman Patman indicts foundations for another kind of practice that is even more obscure to the observer than the inner-dealing
we have just discussed. This is the accumulation of funds from unexpended income by a tax-exempt organization-a state of affairs which
can be detected only by an x-ray of the foundation's balance sheet. The
534 foundations studied by the Patman Committee held over 900 million dollars in accumulated income at the end of 1960.125 According to
the Report, they paid out only fifty per cent of their aggregate receipts during 1951-1960.126 The writer would agree that even a
casual survey of Schedule 6 of the Report shows many foundations
have accumulated income to the extent of one-third to threequarters of their 1960 net worth (based on market value, not cost). To
some extent these figures evidencing accumulation are the result
of a static, rather than a dynamic, look at foundation balance sheets.
Obviously, the click of a camera shutter will catch some foundations
with money in the till, whereas a running three-to-four-year time
exposure might disclose that the funds were later paid out and even
that indebtedness was incurred. Another distortion in the Patman
Report is that, oddly, all capital gains are classified as additions to
income. 127 Apparently this was done without regard for the dictates
of state laws, trust instruments, sound accounting practice, and, as
we will soon see, the Internal Revenue Code itself, all of which
generally classify such gains as accretions to ·capital or principal. If
capital gains are added to net income, it is easy to see how some of
the most scrupulous organizations would show accumulations.
It is safe to assume that many foundations have been and are
124. The Court of Claims relied on
corporation to pay off its debts before
Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. CI. 797,
125. REPORT 4.
126. Id. at 51.
127. The REPORT expressly so states

an earlier decision which allowed a charitable
making any gifts. See Knapp Bros. Shoe Mfg.
142 F. Supp. 899 (1956).
at 6.
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accumulating true income-rents, interest, dividends, and fees and
charges. However, legal measures are already available to the
Internal Revenue Service that empower it to force out of these
entities funds destined for charitable, educational, religious, or
other exempt uses. Also, under certain circumstances, foundations
are legally justified in accumulating income.

B. Governing Statutory Provisions
Section 504 of the Internal Revenue Code (also a part of the
Revenue Act of 1950) deals exclusively with accumulations. 128 The
restrictions of section 504, as well as the prohibited transactions of
section 503, are in addition to and not in limitation of the restrictions contained in section 50l(c)(3). To paraphrase the statutory
language, section 504 provides that exemption shall be denied for
the taxable year if the amounts the tax-exempt organization has
accumulated during that year "and not actually paid out" by the
end of the taxable year are:
1. Unreasonable in amount or duration in order to carry
out the exempt purposes of the organization, or
2. Used to a substantial degree for purposes other than its
exempt purpose, or
3. Invested in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying
out of the exempt purpose.

Section 642(c) and section 68l(c) contain slightly different language.
They govern the deduction from income allowable to certain
trusts that make charitable contributions. In section 642(c) it is
provided that any part of the gross income that, by the terms of
the governing trust instrument, is "paid or permanently set aside"
for an exempt purpose during the taxable year is allowable to the
trust as a deduction. Section 68l(c) adds that, if these amounts
"paid or permanently set aside" are of the same nature as the three
prohibited categories above, the amount otherwise allowable to
the trust as a deduction shall be limited to the amount actually
paid out and shall not exceed 20 per cent of taxable income, computed without any charitable contributions deduction. The addition of the language "or permanently set aside" in these sections
gives greater leeway to permissible accumulations by trusts than is
given to private foundations. The reason for the added liberality
would seem to be to allow a donor through a trust instrument,
whether testamentary or inter vivos, to express a charitable intent
128. See also INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 68l(c)(2) for limits on charitable contributions
in instances of unreasonable accumulations of certain trusts.
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that funds be "set aside" to accumulate for a major goal or end
which, at the time of the trust's creation, is not attainable because
of limited assets. Trusts, it seems, may even contain mandatory accumulation provisions, provided they point to a specific charitable
project.129
The regulations, by excluding most capital gains, define the term
"accumulated income" in a manner different from the Patman
Report. The regulations state:
"For the purpose of section 504, the term 'income' means
gains, profits, and income determined under principles applicable in determining the earnings or profits of a corporation.
The amount accumulated out of income during the taxable
year or any prior taxable year shall be determined under the
principles applicable in determining the accumulated earnings
or profits of a corporation. In determining the reasonableness
of an accumulation out of income, there will be disregarded
the following:
"(I) The accumulation of gain upon the sale or exchange
of a donated asset to the extent that such gain represents the
excess of the fair market value of such asset when acquired by
the organization over its substituted basis in the hands of the
organization.
"(2) The accumulation of gain upon the sale or exchange
of property held for the production of investment income, such
as dividends, interest, and rents, where the proceeds of such
sale or exchange are within a reasonable time reinvested in
property acquired or held in good faith for the production of
investment income." 130
Had these standards been applied to the statistical summary of the
Report, the problem of foundation accumulations would have been
considerably ameliorated.
Another criticism made by the Patman Report in this area is
that foundations are substantial stock traders. During the period
of the sharp market break in 1962, thirty-eight foundations marketed 146 million dollars worth of securities.131 If the suggestion
from these statistics is that some foundations are speculators, the
criticism is valid. This is obviously a practice which can become
(and has been ruled to be) a primary, nonexempt purpose. 132 Were
foundations and charitable trusts not to exchange securities from
time to time, however, one could suppose that they would be open
129. A good illustration of this exact point is Erie Endowment v. United States, 316
F.2d 151 (!ld Cir. 1963), discussed in text accompanying note 142 infra.
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.504-l(c) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
131. REPORT 129.
132. See Randall Foundation v. Riddell, 244 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1957).

128

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 63:95

to the equally valid criticisms that they were keeping income-producing property from the market place and thaf the ends of charity
were suffering from the failure of foundations to upgrade their
holdings. The imposition of new legal restrictions on such trading
could conceivably do more overall harm than good by freezing
foundation holdings and totally blocking their activity during
market swings.
C. Illuminating Cases
No one case found in the writer's research has proved more
illuminating on the subject of unreasonable foundation accumulations of income than Samuel Friedland Foundation v. United
States. 133 There a foundation was established with a two per cent
holding of stock in a large corporation of which the donor was
chairman. The foundation's trustees wanted to build and donate
a medical research building estimated to cost five hundred thousand
dollars, a sum far in excess of the foundation's income resources at the
time. In order to build up its annual return, the foundation, aided
by interest-free loans from its creator, bought second and third
mortgages and even some construction mortgages. During the
time of this build-up, the foundation made small annual gifts,
but the bulk of its income was accumulated and invested for the
trustees' main objective. The Commissioner challenged the whole
program on the basis of the accumulations rule, adding that the
borrowing by the foundation was not a permissible "reinvestment"
of income under the applicable regulations.m
The court found that the accumulation was reasonable and that
the foundation's borrowing of money to build up its income-producing assets was tantamount to a "reinvestment in property
acquired and held in good faith for the production of investment
income" under the regulations. The true test of reasonableness, the
court added, is this: "Does the charitable organization have a concrete program for the accumulation of income which will be devoted to a charitable purpose and in the light of existing circumstances is the program a reasonable one?" 135 Answers to these searching questions were found in the purpose of the accumulation, the
ultimate dollar goal, the funds available at the beginning, the likelihood of new funds becoming available from contributions, and
the extent of time required to reach the goal. As to the latter, the
court indicated that under proper circumstances a six, seven, or
133. 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956).
134. Treas. Reg. § l.504-l(c)(2) (1958).
135. 144 F. Supp. 74, 92 (D.N.J. 1956).
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even an eight-year accumulation period could be reasonable. The
court also held that the choice of second and third mortgages as an
investment medium did not come within the prohibitions of section 504(a)(3) as an investment likely to jeopardize the foundation
of the organization. Private foundations, in the absence of contrary charter provisions, are not held to trust fund investment standards. What is unusual about the case is that the court approved of the
foundation borrowing money in order to add to the corpus more stock
in the same corporation. At the time of this borrowing, the foundation had a net worth of 110 thousand dollars. It borrowed funds
from the donor and a bank to acquire 55 thousand shares at a time
when the market for one unit was twenty to twenty-one dollars.
Even though a decline in market price of three dollars would literally have wiped out the foundation, the court accepted as a satisfactory ground the donor's testimony that he, as chairman of the
corporation, was sure at the time of the investment that the stock
would not decline.
A similar holding is found in a 1962 decision by another district
court. 186 There, the principals of the foundation were also the
principals of a company that had advanced and loaned money to
the foundation. When the net worth of the foundation grew to
almost four million dollars, the trustees determined to repay the
outstanding loans before embarking on the ultimate purpose of
the foundation-the construction and endowment of a civic building for Terre Haute, Indiana. The donor's family neither received
loans from the foundation nor collected interest on loans advanced;
the objective of the family was to "beef up" the foundation's financial ability to construct the civic building. Not surprisingly, the
Commissioner again argued that the retiring of indebtedness incurred
in the acquisition of property is the equivalent of accumulating
income.187 But again, it was held that the accumulation was reasonable in view of the foundation's specific goal. To what extent this
holding stemmed from the testimony of foundation officials at trial,
rather than from the foundation's charter purposes, is not made
clear in the opinion of the court. It is submitted that the charter
purposes would provide a far more unimpeachable source than
advised courtroom testimony rendered after the fact.
Another instance of this permitted "bootstrapping" is found in
Commissioner v. Leon A. Beeghly Fund, 188 a·case dealing with the
136. Hulman Foundation v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
137. The Commissioner cited Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 CUM, BuLL. 128.
138. 310 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1962), affirming 35 T.C. 490 (1960).
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accumulation standards applicable to charitable trusts. There, the
court stated: "[T] he use of any such (foundation) income to pay
for the assets which produced it or to pay for other assets which
will produce more income would, under the terms of the trust
agreement, be used exclusively for charitable purposes at some
time." 139 The Beeghly rationale would seem particularly well adapted
to trusts since, as we have seen, gifts to such entities are deductible
if their income is paid or "permanently set aside" for exempt
purposes. 140
The standards that were applied in the Friedland decision produced an opposite result in a very recent decision of the Third Circuit, Erie Endowment v. United States. 141 The court there observed:
"[Erie Endowment] has no natural right to tax exemption,
but rather a Congressional balm granted because losses in tax
revenues were deemed compensated for by the value of its charitable work. Absent a sufficient amount of charitable work commensurate with the total amount of Erie's available charitable
funds, exempt status must cease or, in fact, never come into
existence."142
The court found that, by mandatory accumulation provisions contained in its charter, the Erie Endowment trust had reached the
point in 1958 where its net income was twenty-six thousand dollars
and its accumulated income was 390 thousand dollars. Even considering the language of direction in the trust instrument, this accumulation was felt to be too flagrant to justify honoring the donor's
vague desire to do something "very substantial."143
"The standard to be applied is whether the taxpayer can
justify the total accumulation of income at the end of the taxable year, in terms of both time and amount, on the basis of a
rational to~al program of charitable intent." 144
The court concluded that by this standard the trustees had been
given no program of expenditures nor any specific projects that
would justify the accumulation. The trust was judicially reminded
that its program must be prospective in direction and not occur
expeditiously to the organization "after the Commissioner's shadow
becomes visible." 145
139. 310 F.2d 756, 761 (6th Cir. 1962).
140. For a holding almost as liberal with respect to private foundations, see A.
Shiffman v. Comm'r, 32 T.C, 1073 (1959).
141. 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir: 1963), affirming, 202 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
142. 316 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1963).
143. Id. at 155.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
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D. Some Conclusions on Accumulations
Foundations should not be required to spend their income as
fast as they receive it, even in the absence of a specific and rational
total program of charitable intent. The measure of the accumulation is, of course, the income of the taxable year and all prior years
that is not paid out.146 It would be surprising if an organization
were directed to find use for all income in the very year of its
receipt. Even functional charities are seldom put to such a rigorous
standard. It is submitted that the regulations governing this• aspect
of foundation activity presuppose an intelligent, searching placement of foundation funds among the many possible charitable
recipients. One of the natural advantages of a private foundation
is that it may serve as a reservoir from which donations can be made
with more care and investigation than is the case with the typically
hurried and unsystematic giving that characterizes the month of
December for many individual donors. One thing that the Patman
Report does not strongly criticize is the worth and value of foundation gifts once they are made or committed. Placing foundation
giving on too fast a racetrack could result in just this criticism,
however, and would strike at the very raison d'etre of foundations
as instrumentalities of charitable support.147
V. THE PATMAN

REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Congressman Patman proposes certain remedies for the list of
abuses his report cites. Particularly pertinent to the content of this
article are the following recommendations of the report:
I. Limitation of twenty-five years on the life of foundations;
2. Prohibition of foundations from engaging in business
either directly or indirectly;
3. Prohibition of any commercial money lending or borrowing by foundations;
4. Prohibition of foundation grants to employees of any
company the foundation controls through stock ownership;
5. Limitation of foundation stockholdings to not more than
three per cent of the stock of any one company, and prohibition
of the right to vote stock;
6. Stricter regulation of foundation holdings and investments. In this connection the Report states: "Our study shows
sizable stock market losses for a number of foundations during
146. 6 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 34.17 (1957 ed.).
147. The reader is referred to the following revenue rulings on the scope of permissible foundation accumulation of income: Rev. Rul. 54-137, 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 289;
Rev. Rul. 54-227, 1954-1 CUM. Buu.. 291; Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 CUM. BULL. 128;
Rev. Rul. 55-674, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 264.
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the ten-year period of 1951 through 1960. Did the directors or
trustees reimburse those foundations for such losses? I believe
that the answer would be negative." 148
7. Taxation of income derived from assets acquired by
foundation borrowing;
8. Denial of charitable deduction for any amount given by
a contributor to a foundation he controls unless and until the
foundation puts the contributed money or property to direct
charitable use;
9. Elimination of the "tax profit" on gifts of appreciated
property to foundations;
10. For purposes of figuring the accumulation of income,
all contributions to a foundation and all capital gains from its
operations should be classed as "income";
11. Amounts unreasonably accumulated in private corporations should be added to the accumulation of any foundation
that holds a controlling amount of stock in the corporation,
and corporations controlled by foundations should be subject
to the unreasonable accumulation earnings tax of section 531
of the Code;
12. A regulatory agency for the supervision of tax-exempt
foundations should be considered149
The Report contains other recommendations that deal with gift
and estate taxes, notably the suggestion that gifts to foundations
should not be deductible from the taxable estates of decedents. 150
Finally, the concluding chapter of the Report summarily criticizes
lax enforcement procedures of the Treasury Department. By repeating a series of questions propounded by Congressman Patman
to the Commission.er of Internal Revenue,151 the Report seeks to
show that the Internal Revenue Service has no formal procedure
for public challenge of the exempt status of an organization, that
there are no personal penalties against trustees of foundations that
engage in prohibited transactions, that no specific time is given a
foundation in which to distribute each year's income (subject, of
course, to the rules of section 504), and that there is no prohibition
against family members staffing, and being compensated by, family
foundations. Of course, none of these lapses is due to a lack of
enforcement; there are simply no regulations that would have allowed more definite answers by the Commissioner to the questions.
The work of the Committee is not finished. In a cnapter entitled
148. See REPORT 133.
149. For an extended discussion of these recommendations, see the excellent com•
ment, Krasnowiecki 8: Brodsky, Comment on the Patman Report, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
190 (1963).
150. REPORT 134,
151. Id. at 73-74.
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"Unfinished Business," Congressman Patman promised further investigation of stock sales and stock trading by foundations, of foundation credit arrangements in the purchase of securities, of a possible
conflict of interest between an individual's advisory role as a foundation trustee and his personal business interests, and further analysis
of foundation expenditures-including administrative and operating expenses.152 In fact, as a harbinger of investigations and reports
yet to come, a questionnaire letter has recently Qanuary 1964) been
sent out by the Committee asking foundation trustees for their views
on the several subjects covered by the first installment of the Report.
As this paper is being written, there is evidence that the Patman
Committee is already following through on some of the investigations it earlier promised. Its Report has stirred the Senate Finance
Committee to request from Treasury Secretary Dillon a "study of
possible abuses of private foundations under internal revenue
laws." 158 And, testifying before the Committee on July 21, 1964,
during the first of its public hearings, Secretary Dillon made it clear
that he will offer recommendations at the end of the year or in
early 1965, concerning "self-dealing between a contributor and the
foundation he controls" and the competitive effects of foundationcontrolled corporations on tax-paying companies.154 To Congressman Patman's repeated questions as to whether foundations are
eroding the tax base, however, the Treasury Secretary answered
"that even massive contributions to foundations generally support
worthy causes which, absent such tax-exempt groups, would have
to be either abandoned or taken over by federal and state governments. "ills
Congressman Patman has also continued his charge that the
Internal Revenue Service has been extremely lax in the enforcement
of regulations governing foundations. According to Committee allegations, the Service was "lethargic" in auditing the returns of a
large New York foundation because it assessed the foundation for
only 1952 and 1953 taxes even though the challenged practices
continued afterwards and the matter was not settled until 1963.
Appearing before the Committee on July 22, 1964, Mortimer Caplin,
then the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, declared
that all 534 of the foundations studied by the Patman Committee
have undergone audits, and the tax exemptions of eight have been
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 130-131.
Wall St. J., July 17, 1964, p. 3, col. 2.
Id., July 22, 1964, p. 3, col. 2.
Ibid.
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revoked.11i6 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service, he said, has
established an Exempt Organizations Council to "eliminate administrative obstacles." 157 The Commissioner at the same time added to
Congressman Patman's recommendations by promising that his department would propose legislation to prohibit donor-foundation
transactions, to require foundations to give all their assets to charity
and go out of business within twenty-five years after organization, to
place a limit on the amount of stock one foundation may hold in a
single company, and to put r~strictions on speculative stock market
transactions. 158
VI. A

SUMMING

UP

It is easily seen that some of the Patman Report's recommendations are wholly arbitrary. Clearly in this category are the recommendations limiting to three per cent the amount of stock a foundation may hold in any one corporation and compelling complete
distribution of all assets at the end of twenty-five years of existence.
Also, it has recently been remarked that such supposed reforms would
be much too sweeping for the evil they are designed to curb-namely,
the undesirable impact of tax-exempt foundations on our market
economy. 159
Up until now, we have skirted a real policy issue: whether
private funds and foundations should be permitted to continue to
exist side by side with schools, hospitals, churches, and other functional charities. The Patman Report is not a criticism ,of charitable
ends. Its attack is against the device by which, in the name of those
ends, taxpayers establish a reservoir of tax-free income which then
travels an often delayed, tortuous route before emerging in the
hands of the operating donees. The Report presumes, too unfairly,
that in many such organizations the motive of tax avoidance predominates over the motives of good will and good works. Indeed, in
sections of the Report this presumption is so overtly cynical that it
tends to undermine and discredit many sincere suggestions which
it contains. Consider, for example, the attack on a famous chemical
fortune destined for a family foundation:
"Once again, the 'cream' from one of our nation's great
fortunes will go completely tax free. Once again, the 'skim milk'
incomes of the hardworking majority of the American people
156. Id., July 23, 1964, p. 2, col. 3.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid.
159. K.rasnowiecki &: Brodsky, supra note 149, at 195.
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will be forced to bear a still heavier share of the total tax
burden ....
"Only after (the founder's) death ... will the tax exempt ...
Foundation come into full flower. Then it will receive each
year nearly all the income from the family estate's vast empire
of banking, industry, railroads and real estate-and that income
will wholly escape income tax.es." 160
This is not so much an attack on foundations as it is a cavalier
criticism of tax avoidance th~ough donation to charity. It suggests
that charity should no longer be a private concern, that it should
no longer offer an alternative to the payment of income tax.es, and
that only the federal government could fairly operate in this fieldsuggestions beyond the original investigative mission of the Committee. This type of thinking adversely affects the more constructive
parts of the Report.
We have already suggested that a main purpose of private
foundations is to "systematize" charitable giving by providing an
entity that will outlive the donor or creator and prolong an otherwise ephemeral scheme of donation. The availability of a private
foundation also tends to speed charitable giving prior to death and
avoids the inevitable delays attending a testamentary disposition of
the same funds. That a donor or creator often chooses his family
members to fill trusteeships initially is not ipso facto evidence of
nepotism or bad faith. Nor is the bare fact that there is put into
the created foundation large amounts of stock in a single company
at all inimical to a charitable purpose. Often, a single block of
securities is all a donor has to contribute. Indeed, Congressman
Patman contradicts himself by simultaneously criticizing foundations for retaining large blocks of stock and complaining about the
market volume of trading and exchange in which they allegedly
indulge. It is submitted that, unless foundations are to be outlawed
altogether, leaving nothing but operating charities, the personnel of
their boards and the securities of their portfolios are a secondary
consideration, deserving certainly of scrutiny but not of wholesale
reform.
Perhaps Congress will ultimately place foundations under standards of trust and requirements of operation akin to those applied to
banks and life insurance companies. In fact, the Report suggests
that, if foundations were treated "the way the tax law now does
trusts," a donor would be denied a charitable deduction for amounts
160.

CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMMITI'EE ON SMALL BUSINESS,

88th

Cong.,

2d

SC!S., TAX•ExEMPl' FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRusrs: THEIR IMPAcr ON OUR EcoNOMY

(Comm. Print 1964).
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he contributes to his controlled foundation until such time as the
foundation actually uses the money for charity.161 Similarly, income
earned by the foundation would be taxable to the controlling donor
until expended for one of the foundation's charitable purposes.
However, this suggestion would be impossible to implement without
rewriting the sections of the Code that deal with the taxability of
creators of private trusts.162
The Patman Report's criticism of 'the business and commercial
activities of foundations as well as their accumulated, undonated
income is more on point. The second concluding recommendation
of the Report states that "tax exempt foundations should be prohibited from engaging in business directly or indirectly."16 s This
article has cited abuses, both in the area of foundation competition
with profit enterprises and in the area of foundation accumulation
of income. In the first area, as present deterrents we have the "operational" test and the tax on unrelated business income. The
difficulty, however, is that a large foundation may be operated
primarily for eleemosynary purposes and yet engage in a relatively
small activity which touches the area of competition of small businesses. It is submitted that more "relation" should be required of
such so-called "unrelated" business activities. In other words, a
qualitative test should be added to the present quantitative standards of the "operational" test. Such a test would require that foundations not only be operated primarily for their exempt purpose in
order to maintain tax-free status, but also that any business income
(i.e., income earned from active, not passive, sources) be "related"
to the accomplishment or furtherance of the charter purposes. Under
this suggested test, "unrelated" business income would be taxed, and
its receipt would become the equivalent of a prohibited transaction,
resulting in loss of exemption. The latter result, or the threat of it,
would constitute a far greater deterrent than the present subjection
of unrelated activities to tax. Concurrent with such a revision should
also come a closing of the "subsidiary loophole." As was earlier
pointed out,164 outright foundation ownership of a separately incorporated business subsidiary provides an escape from the prohibited
transaction rules. This device also permits the business subsidiary
161. REPORT 133-34.
162. Specifically INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §§ 673(a) (b), 676-778.
163. Emphasis added. Congressman Patman explained the word "indirectly" by
stating: "Foundations controlling corporations engaged in business, through the extent
of stock ownership in those corporations, should themselves be deemed to be engaged
in that business." See Krasnowiecki & Brodsky, supra note 149, at 193.
164. See text accompanying note S5 supra.
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to accumulate earned income free of the section 531 accumulated
earnings tax since no motive of avoiding income tax can be attributed to a shareholder who is tax-exempt.
A third reform should be the tightening up of rules relating to
accumulated income. The longer the route between donation of
funds to a foundation and their application by the foundation to
functional, charitable ends, the less reason the American tax.paying
public has for granting tax shelter to those funds. It is difficult to
formulate a proper policy here. While the initial bootstrapping of
foundation assets by borrowing and then accumulating funds to
retire the indebtedness is susceptible to abuse, the alternative would
be for a donor to incur a personal indebtedness and acquire the
property before establishing the foundation. But, this alternative
would require the loan to be amortized with tax.able income. One
can make a good case for the proposition that the ends of charity
are better served by permitting the nontaxed foundation to do the
borrowing. One approach to this problem could be a strict application of the Samuel Friedland Foundation doctrine.165 Foundations
could be made to justify accumulations of more than, for example,
two years' duration by "statements of intent" filed with their annual
information returns (Form 990-A), a practice which is presently
pursued by circumspect foundations. Rather than merely listing
their year-beginning and year-ending aggregate accumulation as is
now required by the return, foundations should be required to state
the specific purpose of the accumulation and its intended duration
in years. Any changes in the accumulated fund should be footnoted
and explained. If this practice were followed, accumulations could
be checked annually, and their purpose enforced, by the Internal
Revenue Service. A change in the purpose of the accumulation, as
well as an extension of its term, should require Internal Revenue
Service approval.
In connection with accumulations, it should also be noted that
private foundations-and those usually accumulating funds for at
least one year or more-lost a point to publicly-supported foundations under the Revenue Act of 1964.166 A new statutory distinction
between the two types of exempt groups was there created which
may emphasize to private foundations the importance of making
speedier charitable application of their income. The law opened
wider the category of charitable and educational gifts that qualify
for the additional ten per cent (total of thirty per cent) charitable
165. 144 F. Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1956), and see earlier discussion of case.
166. See P.L. 88•272, 26 U.S.C.A. § 170 (1964).
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deduction by including, inter alia, gifts made to publicly-financed
foundations. 167 The House Committee on Ways and Means explained why the enlarged deduction was not being extended to
private foundations:
"Your committee is limiting the additional 10-percent deduction to organizations which are publicly or governmentally
supported, however, and is not making this additional deduction available in the case of private foundations. These latter
types of organizations frequently do not make contributions to
the operating philanthropic organizations for extended periods
of time and in the meanwhile use the funds for investments.
The extra IO-percent deduction is intended to encourage immediately spendable receipts of contributions for charitable
organitations." 168
Still another distinction drawn by the 1964 Act will undoubtedly
have a cathartic effect on private foundations, causing them to break
up and discharge accumulated income. Subsection l 70(g), added to
the Code in the 1964 Act, restricts the "unlimited charitable contributions deduction" to gifts made to publicly supported organizations
(those eligible for the thirty per cent limitation) and to certain
"operating" private foundations. The latter are elaborately defined,
and contributions to them will qualify for the unlimited deduction
only if such private foundation,
1. Not later than the close of the third year after the taxable
year in which the foundation receives the contribution,
expends an amount equal to at least fifty percent of such
contribution for:
(a) Active conduct of its charter purposes;
(b) Assets that are directly devoted to such active
conduct;
(c) Contributions to other qualifying organizations, or
(d) Any combination of the above;
and
2. For said three-year period or less, expends all of its net
income (determined without regard to capital gains or losses)
for the purposes described above. 169

Private foundations that expect to receive charitable contributions
from donors who seek to qualify under and stay within the "unlimited charitable contributions deduction" benefits will have to
meet these strict terms. Section l 70(g) is of further interest since it
167. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b){l)(A){vi) (1964).
168. REPORT OF TiiE COMMITI'EE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 8363,
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
169. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(g)(3) (1964).
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may be a harbinger of future regulations. The three-year accumulations period could conceivably turn into a general rule of qualification for income tax-exemption of funds and foundations.
Nothing has been suggested here with respect to inner-dealing
within and among foundations, their creators, and their trustees.
Changes in this facet of foundation regulation may evolve in the
next few years as a result of rules recently enacted with respect to
self-employed individuals' retirement trusts. In the Self-Employed
Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, owner-employees who
"control'' the trade or business with respect to which the retirement
plan is established are barred from engaging in any transaction with
their own retirement trusts.17° The act absolutely prohibits certain
other transactions of the trusts, such as the lending of funds for any
reason whatsoever, the paying of any compensation for personal
services rendered, the making available of any services on a preferential basis, and the sale to or purchase from the trust of any assets.
Whether these strict regulations will, by affinity, "rub off" on the
more liberal private foundation requirements is uncertain; but the
Patman Committee cannot be presumed to be unaware of this most
recent parallel.
Of course, increased regulation by the several states would also
be 'a corrective measure. A few states have passed the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act.171 Although the act
does not apply to charitable corporations that are organized and
operated primarily for educational, religious, or hospital purposes,
it states with respect to charitable trusts: "It is hereby declared to
be the policy of the state that the people of the state are interested
in the administration, operation and disposition of the assets of all
charitable trusts in the state ...." 172 The state attorney general is
directed to maintain a register of trusts and trustees, trust instruments and inventories of trust assets must be filed, and sworn testimony from trustees may be required and documents subpoenaed.
The stated purpose behind all of this is to ascertain whether the
trusts "are being properly administered.'' 173 This legislation, even
though requiring duplicate report filing and the consequent added
paper work, tends to enforce upon charitable trusts an adherence
to their stated purposes. Its thrust is more specific, more direct, and
170. Now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 503(j).
171. See, e.g., Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 14.251-.266 (Supp. 1961); California:
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12580-96 (1963); Oregon: Ore. Laws 1963, ch. 583, pp. 1186-91
(1963).
172. MICH. COMP. LAws § 14.251 (Supp. 1961).
173. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 14.256(b) (Supp. 1961).
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more germane to charitable purposes and their execution than are
many of the more ponderous recommendations of the Patman
Report.
On balance, it is clear that Congressman Patman has initiated
a debate that will continue for years, until either the excesses of
some foundations are curbed voluntarily or the penalty of remedial
legislation is suffered by all. If the writer has appeared critical of the
Report, it is mainly because the Report tends toward negative and
alarmist comment, rather than constructive suggestion. Little is said
about the hundreds of private funds and charitable trusts and corporations that hew to the line, word, and letter of the regulations
and whose charitable goals relieve the taxpayer of the less economical, and indeed questionable, administration of charity by the
federal government. By highlighting the salient points of the Report
against the background of existing laws and regulations, the writer
has attempted to offer the opportunity of judgment to the reader.
It is hoped that the final verdict on the future of tax-exempt organizations will not be reached until a carefully-made record has been
presented to, and digested by, the American taxpayer. In the meantime, foundations will have to weather, as best they can, the close
scrutiny that today attends tax exemption of major portions of the
nation's wealth.

